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Abstract
Within the literature on non-cooperative game theory, there have been a number of algorithms which will
compute Nash equilibria. This paper shows that the family of algorithms known as Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) can be used to calculate Nash equilibria. MCMC is a type of Monte Carlo simulation that
relies on Markov chains to ensure its regularity conditions. MCMC has been widely used throughout the
statistics and optimization literature, where variants of this algorithm are known as simulated annealing.
This paper shows that there is interesting connection between the trembles that underlie the functioning
of this algorithm and the type of Nash refinement known as trembling hand perfection. This paper shows
that it is possible to use simulated annealing to compute this refinement.
Keywords:Trembling Hand Perfection, Equilibrium Selection and Computation, Simulated Annealing, Markov
Chain Monte Carlo
1 Introduction
This paper develops an algorithm to compute a desired type of Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore we use
this algorithm to show existance and uniqness of sensible Nash Equilibrium. Our novel approach to this
problem has been motivated by the number of existance algorithms. The basis of the general approach of
the literature has been to rely on the geometric properties of the equilibrium.
This paper is interested in computing Nash equilibria that satisfy the type of Nash of refinement refered
to as ”trembling hand” perfection [16] [17]. This paper shows that simulated annealing can be used to
compute the above refinement. Simulated annealing is a type of Monte Carlo sampling procedure that
relies on Markov chains to ensure its regularity conditions. Most applications have mainly concentrated on
problems of combinatorial optimization such as routing and packing problems, or problems from statistical
pattern recognition like image processing.
Another well known group of algorithms for calculating Perfect Nash Equilibria are the trace algorithms
of Harsanyi and Selten [7], where an outcome for the game is selected by “tracing” a feasible path through
a family of auxiliary games. The solution progress along the feasible path is intended to represent the way
in which players adjust their expectations and predictions about the play of the game.
A major limitation of the tracing procedure is that the logarithmic version of this method, does not
always provide a path that traces to a perfect equilibrium. Harsanyi [6, p.69], has argued that this problem
can be resolved by eliminating all dominated pure strategies before applying the tracing procedure. However
van Damme [19, p.77] constructs examples which do not rquire dominated pure strategies in which the
tracing procedure yields a non-perfect equilibrium. Furthermore it was suggested by van Damme that the
inconsistancy lies in the logarithmic control costs. Games which have a control cost parameter are of normal
form so that players may also choose strategies, incur depending on how well they choose to control their
actions.
Another limitation of the tracing procedure it relies on the algeobro-geometric properties of the equilib-
rium. This approach has been commonly used throughout the literature for computing the equilibrium of
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non-cooperative games. For example the focus of Lemke and Howson [10] for bimatrix games and the Wilson
[21] and Scarf [15] algorithm for the N -person games has also been to utilise the fundamental geometry of
games to calculate equilibrium. In general these approaches to Equilibrium calculation are computationally
expensive.
However, within game theory there is a history of Monte Carlo methods being applied to solve non-
cooperative games, e.g. starting with Ulam [18] in 1954. From the view point of applying global optimization
techniques to infinite games, Monte Carlo simulation has been used by Georgobiani and Torondzadze as a
means of providing Nash equilibria for rectangular games [3]. This is the approach that we will be developing
in this paper.
This paper is organised as follows. The second section of this paper introduces the MCMC algorithm
and provides some discussion of its convergence properties in terms of Markov chain theory. As a starting
point for this discussion the connection between MCMC sampling techniques and Monte Carlo sampling
techniques is explored. The MCMC algorithms include the Gibbs sampler and the Metropolis algorithm
and are often called simulated annealing. The third section of this paper will provide a characterization of
these algorithms in terms of the trembling hand of trembling hand perfection. With this in mind, we provide
an example of the use of simulated annealing applied to calculating Nash equilibrium. In this example the
solution leads to equilibria that result from trembling hand perfection.
2 A Review of Simulated Annealing
Monte Carlo simulation has been used extensively for solving complicated problems that defy an analytic
formulation. The main idea behind Monte Carlo simulation is to either construct a stochastic model that is
in agreement with the actual problem analytically, or to simulate the problem directly. One problem with
Monte Carlo methods is that if the underlying probability distribution is non-standard, then the convergence
of sampled stochastic process cannot be assured by the SLLN. One way around this is to realize that a
stochastic process can be generated from any process that draws its samples from the support of underlying
distribution. Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) does this by constructing a Markov chain that uses the
underlying distribution as its stationary distribution. This enables the simulation of the stochastic process
for non-standard distributions, while ensuring that the SLLN will hold.
As an illustration of the MCMC we will discuss the Metropolis algorithm [11]. In this algorithm, each
iteration will comprise h updating steps. Let Xt.i denote the state of Xi at the end of the tth iteration. For
step i of iteration t+ 1, Xi is updated using the Metropolis algorithm. The candidate Yi is generated from
a proposal distribution qi (Yi|Xt,i, Xt,−i), where Xt,−i denotes the value of
X−i = {X1, ..., Xi−1, Xi+1, ..., Xh}
after completing step i− 1 of iteration t+ 1, i.e.
Xt,−i = {Xt+1,1, ..., Xt+1,i−1, Xt.i+1, ..., Xt.h} ,
where the components Xt,i+1, ..., Xt,h have yet to be updated and components Xt+1,1, ..., Xt+1,i−1 have
already been updated. Thus the proposal distribution of the ith component qi (·|·, ·), generates a candidate
for only the ith component of X . The candidate is accepted with probability
α (X−i, Xi, Yi) = min
(
1,
pi (Yi|X−i) q (Xi|Yi, X−i)
pi (Xi|X−i) q (Yi|Xi, X−i)
)
,
where
pi (Xi|X−i) =
pi (X)∫
pi (X)dX.i
is the full conditional distribution for Xi under pi (·). If Y.i is accepted, then Xt+1,i = Yi; otherwise Xt+1,i =
Xt,i. For this reason α (X.−i, X.i, Y.i) is known as the Metropolis criterion.
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One of the disadvantages of this algorithm is the complexity of the Metropolis criterion α (X.−i, X.i, Y.i).
In practice α (X.−i, X.i, Y.i) often simplifies considerably, particularly when pi (·) derives from a conditional
independence model [5] [14]. However, the single component Metropolis algorithm has the advantage of
employing the full conditional distributions for pi (·) and Besag [1] has shown that pi (·) will be uniquely
determined by its full conditional distribution. As a result α (X.−i, X.i, Y.i) will generate samples from a
unique target distribution pi (·).
An alternative approach for constructing a Markov chain with a stationary distribution pi (·) , that pro-
vides a generalization of the approach suggested by Metropolis et al. [11], has been suggested by Hastings
[8]. At each point in time t, the next state Xt+1 is chosen by first sampling a candidate point Y from a
proposal distribution q (·|Xt). The candidate point Y is then accepted in accordance with the criterion
α (X,Y ) = min
(
1,
pi (Y )
pi (X)
)
.
Under this criterion, if the candidate point is accepted, then Xt+1 = Y , otherwise Xt+1 = Xt. The main
difference between this algorithm and the one proposed by Metropolis et al. [11], is that the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm, as it is named, assumes that the proposal distributions are symmetric, i.e. q (Y |X) =
q (X |Y ). The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is therefore ruled out for higher dimensional problems, as
these problems generally have little symmetry. The main advantage of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
is that proposal distribution has no impact on the decision criterion, and therefore will not impact on the
convergence of this algorithm towards the stationary distribution pi (·).
To provide a fuller explanation, the transition kernel of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is given by
P (Xt+1|Xt) = q (Xt+1|Xt)α (Xt, Xt+1)
+ I (Xt+1 = Xt)
[
1−
∫
q (Y |Xt)α (Xt, Y ) dY
]
,
(2.1)
where I (·) is the indicator function. From α (Xt, Xt+1), we can see that
pi (Xt) q (Xt+1|Xt)α (Xt, Xt+1) =
pi (Xt+1) q (Xt|Xt+1)α (Xt+1, Xt) .
This implies that
pi (Xt)P (Xt+1|Xt) = pi (Xt+1)P (Xt|Xt+1) .
Integrating both sides of this equation, we get∫
pi (Xt)P (Xt+1|Xt) dXt = pi (Xt+1) .
This equation states that if Xt is drawn from pi, then so must Xt+1. In other words, once one sample value
has been obtained from the stationary distribution, then all subsequent samples must be drawn from the
same distribution.
This is only a partial justification of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. A full proof requires that
P (t) (Xt|X0) converges on the stationary distribution. For a heuristic justification of this result, it can be
noted that this distribution will depend only on the starting value X0, therefore the proof must show that
Markov chain gradually forgets its starting point, and converges on a unique stationary distribution. Thus,
after a sufficiently long burn-in of m iterations, points {Xt; t = m+ 1, ..., n} will be dependent sample ap-
proximations of the stationary distribution. Hence the burn-in sample is usually discarded when calculating
the ergodic mean for f (X)
f¯ =
1
m− n
n∑
t=m
f (Xt) .
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3 Trembling Hand Algorithm
3.1 A MCMC Algorithm for Computing Perfect Equilibria in Strategic Games
In this sub-section we provide an algorithm for computing a perfect equilibrium for a strategic game and
show that this algorithm provides a sequence of perturbed mixed strategies that will eventually converge
on perfection. The basic idea is to construct select a Markov chain and then use this Markov to deliver a
Nash equilibrium via Markov chain approximation. The trick is to nominate the appropriate Markov chain
with the most suitable convergence properties to deliver convergence of the sequence completely mixed Nash
equilibria of perturbed games or ε-perfect equilibria to a perfect equilibrium. This is the objective that is
undertaken in this section.
Consider an n-person game in strategic form G =
(
N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
in which N = {1, ..., n} is the
player set, each player i ∈ N has a finite set of pure strategies Si = {si1, ..., siki} and a pay-off function
ui : ×i∈NSi → R mapping the set of pure strategy profiles ×i∈NSi into the real number line.
In the strategic game G, for each player i ∈ N there is a set of probability measures ∆i that can be
defined over the pure strategy set Si, this is player i’s mixed strategy set. The elements of the set ∆i are of
the form pi : Si → [0, 1] where
∑ki
j=1 pij = 1, with pij = p (sij) , i.e. ∆i is isomorphic to the unit simplex.
We denote the elements of the space of mixed strategy profiles ×i∈N∆i by p = (p1, ..., pn) , where
pi = (pi1, ..., piki) ∈ ∆i. As is the convention we use the following short-hand notation p = (pi, p−i), where
p−i denotes the other components of p.
For each player i, the pay-off function ui : ×i∈N∆i → R can be extended to the domain of mixed
strategy profiles ×i∈N∆i. The pay-off function for each player i ∈ N will be defined as follows ui (pi, p−i) =∑ki
j=1 pijui (sij , p−i). A mixed strategy p ∈ ×i∈N∆i is Nash equilibrium of the strategic game G, if for
all players i ∈ N and all p′i ∈ ∆i
ui (pi, p−i) ≥ ui (p
′
i, p−i) . (3.1)
Suppose that as well there being a positive probability pij of a player i selecting a pure strategy sij ∈ Si,
there is a small probability εij that the pure strategy sij will be chosen by i out of error. In the case where
player i selects his jth pure strategy sij by mistake, the probability of doing so is given by qij . The total
probability of player i selecting a pure strategy sij ∈ Si is then given by
pˆij = (1− εij) pij + εijqij . (3.2)
It can be seen that in this case, the total probability of player i selecting a pure strategy sij ∈ Si will be
bounded below by
pˆij ≥ εijqij . (3.3)
Equating ηij = εijqij we can see that this condition can be rewritten as
pˆij ≥ ηij ∀ sij ∈ Si and i ∈ N, (3.4)
with
ki∑
j=1
ηij < 1 ∀ i ∈ N. (3.5)
This leads to the definition of a perturbed game (G, η) as a finite strategic game derived from the strategic
game G, in which each player i’s mixed strategy set is the set of completely mixed strategies for player i
constrained by the probability of making an error
∆i (ηi) = pi =
{
(pi1, ...., piki) ∈ ∆i; pij ≥ ηij and
∑ki
j=1
ηij < 1
}
(3.6)
A mixed strategy combination p ∈ ×i∈N∆i (ηi) is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game (G, η) iff the
following condition is satisfied
ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) then pij = ηij , ∀ sij , sil ∈ Sj . (3.7)
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A mixed strategy p ∈ ×i∈N∆i is a perfect equilibrium in the strategic game G if there exists a sequence
of completely mixed strategy profiles
{
pk
}∞
k=1
where limk→∞ p
k = p, and for every player i ∈ N and for
every p′i ∈ ∆i
ui
(
pi, p
k
−i
)
≥ ui
(
p′i, p
k
−i
)
∀ k = 1, 2, .... (3.8)
In terms of our definition of a perturbed game, a mixed strategy is a perfect equilibrium iff there exist some
sequences
{
ηk =
(
ηk1 , ...η
k
n
)}∞
k=1
and
{
pk =
(
pk1 , ...p
k
n
)}∞
k=1
such that
1. each ηk > 0 and limk→∞ ηk = 0,
2. each pk is a Nash equilibrium of a perturbed game equilibrium
(
G, ηk
)
, and
3. limk→∞ p
k = p where for every player i ∈ N and for every p′i ∈ ∆i
ui
(
pi, p
k
−i
)
≥ ui
(
p′i, p
k
−i
)
∀ k = 1, 2, .... (3.9)
An alternative definition of perfection has been made Myerson [12, pp 75–76] and is based on the idea
that every pure strategy in a player’s set of pure strategies has associated with it a small positive probability
of at least ε > 0, but on strategies that are best responses have associated probabilities greater that ε. More
formally, for any player i ∈ N a mixed strategy pi ∈ ∆i is an ε-perfect equilibrium iff it is completely
mixed and
ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) then pij ≤ ε, ∀ sij , sil ∈ Sj . (3.10)
Unlike Nash equilibria of perturbed games, the ε-perfect equilibria of a game G will not necessarily be one of
its Nash equilibria. However, Myerson does show that p = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ ×i∈N∆i will be a perfect equilibrium
iff
1. each εk > 0 and limk→∞ ε
k = 0,
2. each pk is an εk-perfect equilibrium of the game G, and
3. limk→∞ p
k
i = pi for every player i ∈ N.
The starting basis for the MCMC algorithm for calculating perfection will be to follow Myerson by
constructing a sequence of ε-perfect equilibria for the strategic game G. As stated above, we know that
for the strategic game G, p ∈ ×i∈N∆i is an ε-perfect equilibrium iff for each player i ∈ N , pi ∈ ∆i is a
completely mixed strategy and
ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) then pij ≤ ε,
∀ sij , sil ∈ Sj .
(3.11)
Following Myerson [12, p 79] we define the following set of mixed strategies for each player i ∈ N
∆∗i = {pi ∈ ∆i; pij ≥ δ ∀ sij ∈ Si} , (3.12)
where
δ =
1
m
εm, 0 < ε < 1 (3.13)
with m = maxi∈N |Si|. We then define a point-to-set mapping Fi : ×i∈N∆
∗
i → ∆
∗
i to be a family of
completely mixed distributions contained in ∆∗i
Fi (p1, ..., pn) = {p
∗
i ∈ ∆
∗
i ;ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i)
then pij ≤ ε, ∀ sij , sil ∈ Sj}
(3.14)
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If we then define, for each player i ∈ N , a mixed strategy
p∗il =
eρ(sij)∑ki
l=1 e
ρ(sil)
, (3.15)
where
ρ (sij) = |{sil ∈ Si;ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) and p ∈ ×i∈N∆
∗
i }| (3.16)
Then it can be seen that p∗i ∈ Fi (p1, ..., pn) will be non-empty. As each Fi (p1, ..., pn) will a finite collection
of linear inequalities, they will also be closed convex sets. In addition each Fi (p1, ..., pn), by the continuity
of the pay-off function ui (sij , ·) , will also be upper semi-continuous.
As a consequence the mapping F : ×i∈N∆
∗
i → ×i∈N∆
∗
i satisfies all the conditions of the Kakutani Fixed
Point Theorem. In other words there exists some completely mixed strategy pε ∈ ×i∈N∆
∗
i such that pε is
an ε-perfect equilibrium of G. As ×i∈N∆i is compact, the sequence ε-perfect equilibria pε → p as ε → 0,
where p is the perfect equilibrium of G.
An alternative route to the same result can be arrived at as follows using an argument based on the
convergence properties Markov chain.
Theorem 3.1. For any normal form game G =
(
N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, it is possible to define a MCMC
algorithm such that its transition probabilities will converge to a perfect equilibrium as long as the following
conditions hold:
1. if ui
(
sij , p
k
−i
)
−ui
(
sil, p
k
−i
)
≥ 0 then accept, where pk−i is the tuple mixed strategies selected on the kth
iteration;
2. otherwise, accept if probability exp
(
ui(sil,pk
−i)−ui(sil,p
k
−i)
T
)
> ε, where ε ∼ U [0, 1] ; and
3. in addition it can be seen that for all sij and sil ∈ Si such that ui
(
sij , p
k
−i
)
< ui
(
sil, p
k
−i
)
, αijl (T )→ 0
as T →∞.
Proof. For each player i ∈ N , there will be a collection these subsets
Nij = {sil ∈ Si;ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) and p ∈ ×i∈N∆
∗
i } (3.17)
of i’s pure strategy space Si. The collection of these sets will referred to as player i’s local neighborhood
structure. What we would like to do is for any two pure strategies sij , sil ∈ Si define a path from sij to sil
such that
sij1 ∈ Nij , sij2 ∈ Nij1 , ..., sil ∈ Nijm . (3.18)
In order to do this, we observe that the point-set mapping defined by the set
Fi (p1, ..., pn) = {p
∗
i ∈ ∆
∗
i ;ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) then pij ≤ ε, ∀ sij , sil ∈ Si} (3.19)
is a collection homogenous transition probabilities Si
pijl (k) = Pr {si (k) = sil|si (k − 1) = sij} = Pr {sil|sij} . (3.20)
Further more we can see that these transition probabilities have the Markov property, i.e. given the path
from sij to sil such that
sij1 ∈ Nij , sij2 ∈ Nij1 , ..., sil ∈ Nijm . (3.21)
the conditional probability
Pr {silsij1 , sij2 , ...sijm , sij}
= Pr {sil|sijm}Pr
{
sijm |sijm−1
}
..Pr {sij2 |sij1}
(3.22)
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We define the following generating probability for the Markov chain for each player i ∈ N
gijl =
{ 1
ρ(sij)
, if sil ∈ Nij
0, otherwise,
(3.23)
where
ρ (sij) = |{sil ∈ Si;ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) and p ∈ ×i∈N∆
∗
i }| . (3.24)
We now introduce the following acceptance probability
αijl (T ) =
{
1, exp
(
ui
(
sij , p
k−1
−i
)
− ui
(
sil, p
k−1
−i
)
T
)}
,
T > 0
(3.25)
where T is a control parameter. This last condition implies that
1. if ui
(
sij , p
k
−i
)
− ui
(
sil, p
k
−i
)
≥ 0 then accept, where pk−i is the tuple mixed strategies selected on the
kth iteration;
2. otherwise, accept if probability exp
(
ui(sil,pk
−i)−ui(sil,p
k
−i)
T
)
> ε, where ε ∼ U [0, 1] ; and
3. in addition it can be seen that for all sij and sil ∈ Si such that ui
(
sij , p
k
−i
)
< ui
(
sil, p
k
−i
)
, αijl (T )→ 0
as T →∞.
Given theses three conditions we can now see that the following will hold:
• We know that under this acceptance criterion as k → ∞ The transition probability matrix pki of the
homogenous Markov chain generated by the game G will converge on a stationary distribution pi (T )
as k →∞.
pki → pii (T ) =
e−C(i)/T∑
k∈E e
−C(k)/T
(3.26)
and as T →∞
pii (T ) =
{ 1
|Ni|
if i ∈ H
0 otherwise
(3.27)
where
Ni = {sil ∈ Si;ui (sij , p−i) < ui (sil, p−i) , pi = 0} . (3.28)
(See van Laarhoven and Aarts [20, p.22–25] for the proof of this last statement.)
• The transition probability matrix pki satisfies Myerson’s definition of an ε-perfect equilibria and as
Myerson has shown, the fixed point that this sequence converges on is also a perfect equilibrium.
4 An Application to Extensive Form Games
There are problems with viewing the existence of Nash equilibria as an end in itself. The most immediate
problem with this has been the possible large number of Nash equilibria that can be found for any game,
together with the likelihood that not all of these Nash equilibria will be reasonable in some sense. One way
around this is to view the decision process of each agent participating in the game from a decision theoretic
perspective. From this viewpoint, only those equilibria that can be found by backwards induction will be
self-enforcing. This leads to a technique for strategy space reduction by iteratively removing strategies that
lead to outcomes that are not strongly dominated. As shown by Kuhn [9, Corollary 1], under the assumption
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of perfect information, this leads to a recursion that is equivalent to the Bellman equation of dynamic
programming.
An alternative to this is to construct a recursion that iteratively eliminates weakly dominated strategies.
However, the removal of weakly dominated strategies can lead to the elimination of strategy profiles that
would otherwise provide suitable outcomes if only strongly dominated strategies were to have been removed.
From the viewpoint of this paper these recursive strategy space reduction techniques can be considered
to be an algorithm that reduces the size of a game, making equilibrium selection easier. However, these
iterative reduction techniques becomes unwieldy once the assumption of perfect information is relaxed and
information sets contain more than one node of the game tree.
This has led to a number of refinements to the definition of Nash equilibrium. Among the first of these
was the notion of subgame perfection [16], which removes strategies that are not optimal for every subgame
of a extensive game’s game tree. However, Selten [16] has shown that subgame perfection can also prescribe
non-optimizing behaviour at information sets that are not reached when the equilibrium is played. This is
because the expected payoff for the player whose information set is not reached will not depend on their
own strategy. As a result every strategy will maximize their payoff. As van Damme [19, p. 8–9] states,
that this can be removed if the equilibrium prescribes a choice, at each information set that is a singleton,
that maximizes the expected payoff after the information set. The problem is that not all subgame perfect
equilibria satisfying this criteria are sensible.
Another approach which was suggested by Selten [16], was to eliminate “unreasonable” subgame perfect
equilibria by allowing the possibility of “mistakes” or “trembles” on the part of decision makers. In this way,
isolated information sets are removed, as every information set can now be reached with positive probability.
The other advantage of trembling hand perfection is that, unlike subgame perfection, it can be applied
directly to the normal form of any game. Although, as van Damme shows, the perfect equilibria of a game’s
strategic and extensive forms need not coincide. An equivalence relationship holds for only the agent normal
form and extensive form of any game [16]. This is because the agent normal form of any game views each
node of the game tree, of the extensive form of the game, as a player in the game. As a consequence each
player represents an information set held by the player and will have an identical payoff function to the
player.
As was shown by Selten [16], the perfect equilibria of a game’s strategic and extensive forms need not
coincide. However he showed that an equivalence relationship holds between the equilibria of any extensive
game and its associated agent normal form [16]. This is because the agent normal form of any game views
each node of the game tree, of the extensive form of the game, as a player in the game. As a consequence
each player represents an information set held by the player and will have an identical pay-off function to
the player.
We let Γe define an extensive game consisting of a set of n players, a game tree K = (T,R) consisting of
a set of nodes T and a binary relation R which is a partial ordering on the set of nodes. The nodes of the
game tree are classified as either non-terminal or terminal according to whether or not their are succeeding
nodes in the game tree. The partial ordering is used to define a path of successive nodes. The non-terminal
nodes of the game tree are partitioned into the sets P0, P1, ..., Pn that specify the moves associated with each
player, with P0 being the partition associated with random moves that are not associated with any player.
All of the non-terminal nodes is the information partition U = (U1, ...., Un), where each set Ui is a partition
of Pi into information sets, such that all nodes within an information set u ∈ Ui have the same number of
immediate successors and path intersects an information set at most once. Under the assumption of perfect
information each information set u ∈ Ui will be a singleton. This paper will assume imperfect information –
this implies that if the information set u ∈ Ui contains a node x ∈ Pi, player i will not be able to distinguish
other nodes contained in this information set based on information possessed when moving to x. Throughout
this paper it will also be assumed that complete information is present – i.e. each player has perfect recall
and will remember everything from earlier in the game, including their own moves.
Associated with each random move is a probability distribution p. The payoffs associated with the
set of terminal points Z of the game tree are denoted by the n-tuple r = (r1, ..., rn), where each player’s
payoff is a function of the terminal points ri (z), z ∈ Z. With the information partition U a choice set
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C = {Cu : u ∈ ∪
n
i=1Ui} can be defined, where each Cu is a partition of the union of sets of successors
S (x) = {y;x ∈ P (y)} for each x ∈ u: ∪x∈uS (x). The interpretation is that if player i takes the choice
c ∈ Cu at information set u ∈ Ui , then if i is at x ∈ u, the next node reached is the element of S (x)
contained in c. Under the assumption of imperfect information and perfect recall, a probability distribution
bi is assigned on Cu to each information set u ∈ Ui. This distribution bi is a behavioural strategy, with
the set of all these strategies for player i defined by Bi. The profile of all players behavioural strategies is
denoted by b ∈ B := ×ni=1Bi, where B is the set of all behavioural strategy combinations. The probability
of a particular realization of the game Γe is denoted by Pb (z).
The definition of perfect equilibrium we will use is based Selten [16] and Friedman [2]. Kuhn [9] has
shown that these behavioural and mixed strategies are realization equivalent. Therefore, for an extensive
form game Γe we let Γ = (S,R) define its strategic form representation, with S denoting the set of all mixed
strategy profiles. The payoff profile R is an n-tuple, where the ith element is defined as
Ri =
∑
z∈Z
Pb (z) ri (z) .
A perturbed game of Γ is defined by (Γ, η), where η is a mapping that assigns to every choice in Γ a positive
number ηc such that ∑
c∈Cu
ηc < 1
for every information set u. An equilibrium point b of the strategic game Γ is a perfect equilibrium if b
is a limit point of a sequence {b (η)} as η → 0, where each b (η) is an equilibrium points of the associated
perturbed game (Γ, η).
The algorithm is constructed using a simulated annealing algorithm found in van Laarhoven and Aarts
[20, p. 10]. The pseudo-code for this algorithm is given below:
begin
Intitialize;
M := 0;
repeat
repeat
Perturb(config. i→ j, ∆Rij()) for player 1;
if (∆Rij ≥ 0) then accept
elseif
(
exp
(
−∆Rij
c
)
> rand [0, 1)
)
then accept;
if accept then Update(config. j);
Perturb(config. i→ j, ∆Rij()) for player n;
if (∆Rij ≥ 0) then accept
elseif
(
exp
(
−∆Rij
c
)
> rand [0, 1)
)
then accept;
if accept then Update(config. j);
until equilibrium is approached sufficiently closely;
cM+1 := f (cM );
M :=M + 1;
until stop criterion = true;
end
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The energy function differential for this algorithm is defined as follows:
∆Rij = Rj −Ri, i < j
where the Ri are the expected pay-off functions for each player participating in the perturbed game. The
temperature function c controls the trembles and is updated by the decrement rule
cM+1 = α · cM , 0 < α < 1, M = 1, 2, ... .
We apply it to the following example taken from Friedman [2, p. 51]. This example is based on the three
player extensive form game used by Selten [16] to illustrate the existence of perfect equilibrium. The game
tree is defined as follows in Figure 4 [2, p. 50].
Figure 4.1: Selten’s Horse Game Tree
This game possesses both a perfect equilibrium as well as “non-sensical” subgame perfect equilibria. The
perfect equilibrium for this extensive form game is defined via the perturbed pay-off functions:
R1 = α1(1− ε2 − 3ε3 + 4ε2ε3) + 3ε3
R2 = 2ε3(2− ε1) + α2(1− ε1 − 4e3 + 4ε1ε3)
R3 = 1− ε1 + α3(2ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2),
where the αi are the mixed strategies and εi are errors defined for i = 1, 2, 3. Letting the errors approach
zero, it can be seen that perfect equilibrium is defined by (1, 1, 0).
The results of the simulation are shown below in Figure 4.2 and indicate convergence to the trembling
hand perfect equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
This paper has concentrated on some of the underlying theoretical mechanics of simulated annealing and how
they relate to the trembling hand perfect refinement of Nash equilibrium. It has been argued that the trembles
that underlie global optimization by simulated annealing are analogous to the “mistakes” of trembling hand
perfection, in that they present a means of moving from local equilibria. The main contribution of this paper
10
Figure 4.2: Three-person game with imperfect competition and payoff solutions
has been to apply simulated annealing to solve a game that is known to possess both a perfect equilibrium
and “nonsensical” subgame perfect equilibrium. Preliminary results indicate a convergence to the perfect
equilibrium, with a mixing strategy occurring for two of the three players.
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